In this particular section of
the Part IV (4P28-4P52), Spinoza seeks to determine the relation between emotions
and human nature. To begin with, Spinoza contends that if there is
nothing common between a particular thing and human nature, then that
particular thing can not affect human nature. That is because if a
particular thing determines human action, then it follows from
Spinoza's discussion of attributes (prop. 6, part II) that the nature
of particular thing is bound to share the same attribute with human
nature. Emotions such as pleasure and pain have something in common
with us, since they respectively increase and decrease our power of
acting (P. 29). Laying out this general condition, Spinoza goes on
to specify how emotions correlate with the human nature.
The agreement or
disagreement between human nature and particular things determine how they affect upon human beings. If any particular thing agrees with
human nature, then it is essentially good (4P31). For the agreement
in nature implies that agreed things can not diminish their
respective powers, as it contradicts with already proven proposition that things can be destroyed only by things that are
external to it(3P4). It then follows that insofar as things are bad (i.e. things which cause pain, diminish human power) for humans, to that extent
they disagree with human nature. This may seem contradictory with
what Spinoza has maintained earlier, namely, things can not affect us in any
way if they have nothing in common with us (4P29). How then the pain-causing things affect us? The answer lies in the difference between
being different from and being contrary to human nature. While the former
does not affect us in any way, the latter affects us negatively. That is, the pain-causing things are in negative
relation with human nature, while the non-affecting things are in no
relation at all. However, things only can agree in
power, not in the lack of power (P32). Passions, which belong to the
latter category, do not thus agree with human nature. Passions are the form of emotions that “harass” human
beings (P34). What is more, the passions are the root cause behind the prevalence of discrepancy among
human being. For the passions – or the lack of power –
bar human beings from agreeing with each other's nature. Peter
appears as antagonistic to Paul only when Paul hates or envies
something that Peter possesses (P34), regardless of the efficient
cause of that thing (3P16). In contrast, reason paves the way for
agreement in nature: “ Insofar as men live in accordance with the
guidance of reason, to that extent alone they always necessarily
agree in nature” (4P35). To demonstrate this crucial proposition,
Spinoza specifies the relation between human nature and reason.
Insofar as human nature is conceived according to the reason, to that extent things that emanate from nature are to be understood only through
human nature. The law of human nature, as we know, dictates that human beings always seek what they consider good and avoid what they reckon bad. If a particular thing is good for human nature, then it
is bound to be good for every man (4P35). Human beings thus
agree in nature insofar as they live according to the dictate of
reason. While the passion-directed
hatred generates hatred, the guidance of reason repays the hatred
with love (4P46). We can thus conclude that the guidance of reason does not only safeguard human beings from the power-diminishing passions, but also sets human beings in a harmonious relationship with each other.
Spinoza proposes an elegant solution to a troubling problem for all ethical thought. This is, how do we make sense of what we owe to other people, or what other people have a right to expect from us? Dissolving this problem Spinoza argues that we owe nothing to other people for their own sake, reason demands we act with love where we are met with hate (p46), and that we pursue a peaceful cooperation with all people (p37), all for the sake of our own advancement and self-interest. This idea has a seductive simplicity to it, but can ethics be truly understood solely in terms of self interest, with out any notion of the moral value of other people? Our sole goal in this model is the pursuit of understanding (p26). By this thought, is not the life of abstract intellectual pursuit, which tenaciously strives for understanding but disregards all those works of humanitarian good to be done, a superior moral life?
ReplyDeleteAfter reading some of part IV and the blog posts Spinoza's attention to human nature and the passions is a tricky one. I think human nature embodies reason, emotions as well as thought. Here's the tricky part, when are we ever thinking or doing things purely out reason or emotion and what would call it if if passion and reason acted in unison.
ReplyDeleteit's logical to think and act using reason but no one is a complete stoic and need that 'fire in the belly' to make them act.