Part V. "Prinicples of Correct Living"

       In the first section of Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza discusses how reason can overcome the affects in dictating human action, and how we may best live by the guidance of reason in the absence of full knowledge of our affects. Ultimately, we are left with a theory of habituation, or the frequent contemplation of certain moral truths, discovered through reason, which will guide us through the unknown or poorly understood affects that harass us in our lives.

       Spinoza holds that insofar as we have adequate ideas, we act, and insofar as we have inadequate ideas we are acted upon (IIIP3). In this way, if we form adequate ideas of the affects that affect us, their power over us is lessened (P4). These adequate ideas will be attained through knowledge of the cause of the affects in question (IVP23). There are no affects, or passions, that cannot be understood (P4). Once the power of our reason is increased, through adequate ideas, such that it is greater than that of the affects, the power of the affects will be forced to conform with that of reason (A1, P3). In this way, reason can have power over the affects (P4S). When this happens, and to whatever extent we have adequate ideas of our affects, we are guided by reason and have power over ourselves.

       In the world, however, we may not always have the adequate ideas of our affects that would allow us to be guided directly by reason. As Spinoza explains, When "…we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, [we must] conceive of a correct principle of living…" (P10S). These correct principles of living, or "maxims" (P10S), can be instilled in us through contemplation, and serve to lessen the extent to which we are acted upon by our affects (P9). These principles are akin to Aristotle’s Virtues. Through frequent repetition we may habituate ourselves to these Virtues, or principles, and in this way condition ourselves to live by the guidance of reason, a task that Spinoza suggests would otherwise be difficult or impossible in this world of imperfect knowledge (P10S). The crucial differences between the theories of Spinoza and Aristotle are illustrative of the essence of Spinoza's idea of correct principles. These differences may be seen most clearly in two points. First, that for Spinoza the repetition of these principles seems to be purely contemplative (P10S), while for Aristotle the virtues must be practiced in action. This is a manifestation of Spinoza's irrevocable separation of the attributes, which in understanding thought demands that the perfection of the mind be understood as nothing other than understanding (P4S). The second illustrative point is that for Spinoza, these principles are only a place holder for certain knowledge, to be relied upon in its absence. This stands in contrast to Aristotle's virtues, which are put forward as autonomous from pure reason, defined rather by one’s social environment. The comparison with Aristotle is useful for understanding the place and practice of Spinoza’s principles in our lives. Spinoza’s principles have value only in so far as they are derived from reason. They are universals, or generalizations, regarding what reason would likely prove to be the correct course of action in a specific instance. The principle, "hate is to be conquered by love" (P10S) demonstrates this universal quality. The principles lack an explicit understanding of the particular instance of circumstances on hand, and, in this way, lack the accuracy which comes of a purely rational understanding, based on adequate ideas, of the affects involved.

      Finally, in a discussion of the application of the principles it is important to note that these principles, being universals, and in this way necessarily imperfect, only lessen, through repeated contemplation, the power of the affects(P9). They do not dissolve the affects in the way hate and love are dissolved by having adequate ideas of those things hated or loved (P2). In this way the correct principles increase the influence of reason in our minds, but fall short of the dissolution of the affects that our minds accomplish when in a position of complete understanding.