Spinoza: Atheist or Pantheist

               One major question that keeps arising is whether Spinoza is an atheist or a pantheist.  Now before we can even address this issue, let’s start by defining all the terms that are involved in this issue and using the Spinozic method to start this debate.

D1: Atheism is the belief that there is no god or that god does not exist (I take both sides of this conjunction to mean the same thing)
Cor: there is another definition of atheism, which is that it is the belief that the God of the world Religions does not exist, but since I believe that we would all agree that this is Spinoza’s opinion (see the TTP), it would be pointless to use this definition in this debate.

D2: Pantheism is the belief that nature is God

D3: The term God in both cases refers to some thing that is worthy of worship.
Schol: I use the term thing so that any conception of god would apply to it.  This is not to be confused with the concept of God itselfs, which would cause this discussion to get bogged down into a discussion of God, which is not completely relevant.

I think that we can all agree on the above definitions (if not that will come up at some point in this debate) yet it seems that more clarification is needed.  So the question seems to be whether or not Spinoza believes that god is worthy of worship.  If he does, then he would be a pantheist, if not, then he is an atheist.  The first step seems to be that the term worship needs to be clearly defined.  Once that task is completed, it will be possible to look at Spinoza’s work and determine whether or not he is an atheist or a pantheist.
While we often think that worship has a religious connotation, there are many types of worship.  Beyond worshiping god, there is worship of idols, there is worship of monarchs and heads of states, and there is even to one’s boss.  It is also often the case that in intimate relationships between two people, one or both parties worship the other.  The question then becomes what is common to all these types worship.  In some sense it seems that it is some internal acknowledgement of the greatness of the worshiped, it seems that the important part of this is the public aspect of this acknowledgement.  It seems that one can not be said to worship a monarch without publicly showing it.  In order to truly worship some thing or some one, there must be some public aspect to this worship.  there also seems to be another part of worship where one admits his or her subservience to that thing.  In the case of a monarch it is acknowledging your place under the monarch.  In the case of a lover, it’s your devotion to that person.  So, I propose that worship is the the public acknowledgement of the the greatness of some thing, and your subservience to it.

Given that i can now show how Spinoza is an Atheist.  Spinoza never publicly acknowledged the greatness of his conception of God nor did he make any public claims to be subservient to it.  In fact the only type of worship Spinoza did in his life were in the form Judaic and Christian religious services.  Now the claim might be made that Spinoza’s ethics were in it of themselves a form of worship.  However this claim does not apply to Spinoza. This claim could be made of a person who intends to have his work published.  For example, it might be legitimate to say that Einstein's work was a form of worship to Spinoza’s conception of God.  However, Spinoza’s ethics was his private sentiments, which he never had any intention of publishing and were not written in an easily accessible language.  Only after his death was his work published by friends of his.  This privateness of his ethics makes it clear that Spinoza’s God was a private sentiment and not something that needed to be worshiped.  As such, following from the definitions about, Spinoza was an Atheist.

Self-love is the holiest form of worship

"All things... are in God, and all things that happen, happen only through the laws of God's infinite nature and follow from the necessity of his essence." 1P15-6

"Blessedness consists in love of God" 4P42D

Because all things are in God, and God exist as us, through us, it is no surprise that through the sophistication and refining of ones intellect one can eventually find release from being acted upon by external causes, affects, and attain blessedness. Understanding that we exist in God, and that God expresses as us through us, man can come to see that "men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature" 5P10D.  Having a thorough understanding of oneself, the affects, and right ordering of the affects to the order of the intellect, man can attain blessedness. Blessedness is the contemplation of the mind upon itself, with the knowing of God as its cause. But because God exist as us, and through us, this knowing of God as its cause, is actually the "love the mind has... [as] part of the infinite love by which God loves himself" 5P36D. In this way, self-love becomes the holiest form of worship, as it is ultimately the most intimate and personal love of God.

This is why Spinoza says in 4P37 "The good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men; and this desire is greater as his knowledge of God is greater", because as ones knowledge of God is greater, the more clear it is that God, modes, and existence are one. This oneness is God. It is blessedness where one realizes that working against the nature of other men, is actually working against the nature of him or herself, and as we know, working against our own nature is only caused by inadequate ideas.

Through existence the mind has adequate knowledge of God, and it is through Gods infinite and eternal attribute of mind that man can access God's eternal and infinite intellect. This is why Spinoza calls our mind an "eternal mode of thinking" 5P40S. This is blessedness, this knowing of God as our cause, and of God as us through us. Love for God is "love toward a thing immutable and eternal, which we really fully possess" 5P20. Knowing oneself deeply, and having a greater understanding of the world around oneself, is ultimately having a greater understanding of God. It is reason and reason alone that becomes mans greatest ally in coming to know God, yet knowing God is also knowing oneself. This is why self-love is mans holiest form of worship.

Love Of God

        Of course I was not expecting Spinoza to describe a love for God at all like the sentiment I have become accustomed to.  In these sections of the Ethics (P11-P23), Spinoza describes a new "love", very different from the classic word itself.  Spinoza's "love" for God is more akin to an understanding of nature around us.  It is a knowledge of our existence.  This knowledge of God translates to an intellectual understanding (intellectual love) of God. It is when one recognizes that all affects and images of the mind and body are related to God, they are through God.  The mind must clearly understand that they are because of God.  (P14)  We understand that our nature is a part of God as it follows from one of God’s attributes.  This understanding of our existence is the highest form of knowledge for Spinoza.  When one attains this knowledge and properly grasps it, he or she is at a state of blessedness.  It is a state of high joy that can only be brought about by this “love” of God.

        When I first heard of the concept of the love of God, I immediately thought of the classical sense of love.  Where one loves God and is loved by God in return.  Spinoza is completely against this type of love as he blatantly states: “He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return” (P19).  Spinoza also states that God is a God without passions,  God is not affected by joy or sadness.  God does not hate and consequentially God does not love.  If one expects God to love him back then he expects God to no longer be God.  This is something that has to be expected and is in blatant contrast to religious views of the love of God where one flourishes because he or she is loved by God.  Spinoza does a great job of removing religion from his concept of love.  When one loves God he or she is free from passions, and is therefore free.  This freedom brings joy.  This freedom entails that the person does not fear an eternal consequence after death, does not look forward to an eternal life after death, both of which are removals of religious concepts.  It seems to me that this type of love is just plain and simple understanding.  This leaves me to question can understanding be the same as love?  Therefore can one even really love Spinoza’s God?  How is God affected by this love or by this understanding? Maybe those questions don’t even matter.  If all one has to do is strive to understand that he is because of God, understand that his nature and purpose are all due to the attributes of God, are caused by these attributes, then this will bring with it freedom and joy.  One does what is right and what he or she believes to be important all while striving for this highest knowledge.  In a way, this type of “love” of God brings about a salvation just as the classical ancient religious concept of a love for God would. 

Part V. "Prinicples of Correct Living"

       In the first section of Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza discusses how reason can overcome the affects in dictating human action, and how we may best live by the guidance of reason in the absence of full knowledge of our affects. Ultimately, we are left with a theory of habituation, or the frequent contemplation of certain moral truths, discovered through reason, which will guide us through the unknown or poorly understood affects that harass us in our lives.

       Spinoza holds that insofar as we have adequate ideas, we act, and insofar as we have inadequate ideas we are acted upon (IIIP3). In this way, if we form adequate ideas of the affects that affect us, their power over us is lessened (P4). These adequate ideas will be attained through knowledge of the cause of the affects in question (IVP23). There are no affects, or passions, that cannot be understood (P4). Once the power of our reason is increased, through adequate ideas, such that it is greater than that of the affects, the power of the affects will be forced to conform with that of reason (A1, P3). In this way, reason can have power over the affects (P4S). When this happens, and to whatever extent we have adequate ideas of our affects, we are guided by reason and have power over ourselves.

       In the world, however, we may not always have the adequate ideas of our affects that would allow us to be guided directly by reason. As Spinoza explains, When "…we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, [we must] conceive of a correct principle of living…" (P10S). These correct principles of living, or "maxims" (P10S), can be instilled in us through contemplation, and serve to lessen the extent to which we are acted upon by our affects (P9). These principles are akin to Aristotle’s Virtues. Through frequent repetition we may habituate ourselves to these Virtues, or principles, and in this way condition ourselves to live by the guidance of reason, a task that Spinoza suggests would otherwise be difficult or impossible in this world of imperfect knowledge (P10S). The crucial differences between the theories of Spinoza and Aristotle are illustrative of the essence of Spinoza's idea of correct principles. These differences may be seen most clearly in two points. First, that for Spinoza the repetition of these principles seems to be purely contemplative (P10S), while for Aristotle the virtues must be practiced in action. This is a manifestation of Spinoza's irrevocable separation of the attributes, which in understanding thought demands that the perfection of the mind be understood as nothing other than understanding (P4S). The second illustrative point is that for Spinoza, these principles are only a place holder for certain knowledge, to be relied upon in its absence. This stands in contrast to Aristotle's virtues, which are put forward as autonomous from pure reason, defined rather by one’s social environment. The comparison with Aristotle is useful for understanding the place and practice of Spinoza’s principles in our lives. Spinoza’s principles have value only in so far as they are derived from reason. They are universals, or generalizations, regarding what reason would likely prove to be the correct course of action in a specific instance. The principle, "hate is to be conquered by love" (P10S) demonstrates this universal quality. The principles lack an explicit understanding of the particular instance of circumstances on hand, and, in this way, lack the accuracy which comes of a purely rational understanding, based on adequate ideas, of the affects involved.

      Finally, in a discussion of the application of the principles it is important to note that these principles, being universals, and in this way necessarily imperfect, only lessen, through repeated contemplation, the power of the affects(P9). They do not dissolve the affects in the way hate and love are dissolved by having adequate ideas of those things hated or loved (P2). In this way the correct principles increase the influence of reason in our minds, but fall short of the dissolution of the affects that our minds accomplish when in a position of complete understanding.

the deception of free man

            In the end of book four, Spinoza is discussing the nature of a “free man”.  A free man, according to Spinoza is a man who acts through reason alone.  In 4P72, he claims that “A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively” (237).  In explaining this proposition, Spinoza claims that when a free man acts through deception, it must be virtuous.  This is because a free man is guided by pure reason, and as such would know that the deception would be the greater good.  So, if in some situation a free man deceives someone, then it is the case the in that situation one always deceive another. 

            However, Spinoza seems to be claiming in the demonstration of 4P72 that even in an extreme case where it would seem that it is ok to deceive someone (for example to save your life), a free man would not deceive.  The claim is that he would understand that the institution of agreements would be undermined if he were to start down the path of deception.  That is if the recommended course of action that reason would lead to were deception, it would be the proper course of action, regardless of any situational conditions.  In other words, if reason would lead you to deceive to save your life, then it would also lead to that course of action in all other situations, which Spinoza thinks is absurd.

            This whole line of reasoning seems to rest on the idea that people will always do what is best for them.  A free man would know that it is absurd to act through deception.  However, it would seem that reason would also dictate that one ought to do anything to remain alive.  No one good would be not to act through deception and another good would be to stay alive.  Following from 4P65, it seems that even a free man would, under certain circumstances be able to deceive.  If the free man has a choice between a good and an evil, he will choose the good over the evil.  So, if one needed to deceive in order to save his life, the line of reasoning would not be based on the virtues or vices of deception, but rather it seems that more important line of reasoning would be is it better to live or die, with deception being a second tier of reasoning.  Put slightly differently, but also derived from 4P65, there are two evils, deception and death.  The free man will choose the lesser of the two evils, which would be deception.

Reason, Emotions and Human Nature

In this particular section of the Part IV (4P28-4P52), Spinoza seeks to determine the relation between emotions and human nature. To begin with, Spinoza contends that if there is nothing common between a particular thing and human nature, then that particular thing can not affect human nature. That is because if a particular thing determines human action, then it follows from Spinoza's discussion of attributes (prop. 6, part II) that the nature of particular thing is bound to share the same attribute with human nature. Emotions such as pleasure and pain have something in common with us, since they respectively increase and decrease our power of acting (P. 29). Laying out this general condition, Spinoza goes on to specify how emotions correlate with the human nature.

The agreement or disagreement between human nature and particular things determine how they affect upon human beings. If any particular thing agrees with human nature, then it is essentially good (4P31). For the agreement in nature implies that agreed things can not diminish their respective powers, as it contradicts with already proven proposition that things can be destroyed only by things that are external to it(3P4). It then follows that insofar as things are bad (i.e. things which cause pain, diminish human power) for humans, to that extent they disagree with human nature. This may seem contradictory with what Spinoza has maintained earlier, namely, things can not affect us in any way if they have nothing in common with us (4P29). How then the pain-causing things affect us? The answer lies in the difference between being different from and being contrary to human nature. While the former does not affect us in any way, the latter affects us negatively. That is, the pain-causing things are in negative relation with human nature, while the non-affecting things are in no relation at all. However, things only can agree in power, not in the lack of power (P32). Passions, which belong to the latter category, do not thus agree with human nature. Passions are the form of emotions that “harass” human beings (P34). What is more, the passions are the root cause behind the prevalence of discrepancy among human being. For the passions – or the lack of power – bar human beings from agreeing with each other's nature. Peter appears as antagonistic to Paul only when Paul hates or envies something that Peter possesses (P34), regardless of the efficient cause of that thing (3P16). In contrast, reason paves the way for agreement in nature: “ Insofar as men live in accordance with the guidance of reason, to that extent alone they always necessarily agree in nature” (4P35). To demonstrate this crucial proposition, Spinoza specifies the relation between human nature and reason. Insofar as human nature is conceived according to the reason, to that extent things that emanate from nature are to be understood only through human nature. The law of human nature, as we know, dictates that human beings always seek what they consider good and avoid what they reckon bad. If a particular thing is good for human nature, then it is bound to be good for every man (4P35). Human beings thus agree in nature insofar as they live according to the dictate of reason. While the passion-directed hatred generates hatred, the guidance of reason repays the hatred with love (4P46). We can thus conclude that the guidance of reason  does not only safeguard human beings from the power-diminishing passions,  but also sets human beings in a harmonious relationship with each other. 

Hope and Fear

            Spinoza states that there are only three primary affects, joy, sadness and desire. Man’s very essence is desire, we act solely on it, and this includes all of our appetites and impulses (IIID1). He explains that joy and sadness are not states, but instead passages to and from a greater and lesser perfection (IIID2, D3). It is the journey, not the destination.

Hope and fear for Spinoza are basically interchangeable, they are directly related. We couldn’t have one without the other, since there are both instances in which we hope for something to happen, and in which we hope for something not to happen. It could thus be said that we fear this something from occurring. Spinoza defines hope as an “inconsistent joy” which rises from an image of a past or future thing which we doubt the outcome of. Fear is defined as an “inconsistent sadness” which also arises from an image of a past or future thing which we doubt the outcome of (IIIP18S2). He goes on to state that if doubt is removed from these, hope becomes confidence and fear despair, since we hope for something that we believe will bring us joy, and we fear the thing that we believe will bring sadness. But this is all in our minds, and we chose to believe that which is favorable to us, and deny things that we do not want to happen. Yet all things mean something different to each one of us; something I hope for could be someone else’s greatest fear (IIIP51).

Spinoza believes that hope and fear govern a lot of people’s lives (Nadler 206). People spend their lives either really desiring something to happen, or are in fear of the consequences of it happening. However what people don’t realize is that they have no real control, that they are all predetermined. But because men see themselves as being free, and as being causes of their ends, they buy into their hopes and fears and act according to them.This is how superstitions and omens are born, and begin to slowly take over people’s lives (IIIP50). Nadler notes, as does Spinoza in his TTP, that hope and fear are the very foundation of organized religion (206). People so badly want something to to happen or to not happen, that they would believe almost anything to help or prevent it from happening. But this is not a healthy way to live, being in a constant state of anxiety would make anyone go crazy. Especially since we have no real control over our ends anyway, so both emotions are just a waste of nerve cells.