It is quite possible that I have absolutely no idea what I have just read, or that I have no hint of correctness in my explanation for what it means for a thing to be "natured". I believe that by things being “natured”, Spinoza is trying to say that all things have been created by some aspect of nature. It is impossible for anything to be outside of nature as nature is everything. God is not outside of nature, as God is nature. Nothing can exist outside of God so nature in turn is God. I find it particularly hard to follow Spinoza’s explanations due to their own confusing nature. Before Spinoza, I used to think that God was an entity outside of nature, one that was without association to a certain definition of being but Spinoza quickly takes that notion away by attributing God so directly to nature as to call God nature itself. He says that everything in existence is a part of nature, and there is no conceivable way that they cannot be a part. And according to the nature of God, everything is the way and happens in the way it does with a purpose. They could not have occurred in any other manner (p33, page 106)
For something to be natured, it has to be in accordance with the rules that it is the way it is because it absolutely has to be that way. It is intended to be that way, so I don’t think it is going too far if one was to say that all things in existence are natured. They have their own natures, stemming from the overall nature which is God and God’s intention. Personally I find it difficult to bring it further than saying the simple sentence “everything is because of God”, as that statement seems to be an easily appropriate answer to any question regarding the purpose of anything that one can think of.
Nature itself is something that is natured. Everything that exists in nature exists with a specific purpose that reflects God’s intention for it. There is no way for something to exist in nature without an effect. (p 36, page 109) Everything that is created by God is perfect because God’s nature is perfect. And the things that happen in nature are subject to the laws of nature.
For me it is hard to follow what Spinoza is really trying to say (it does seem that he has a lot more to say than what I am understanding from this) because all that I am getting from this is one overall set of ideas which is that everything is everything. God is nature and nature is God. God’s power is in his essence and God is the cause of himself. Things are because of nature, nature is because of God and God is because of himself. The way in which all things act and exist are God’s essence in themselves. (p 35, page 109) Spinoza says that whatever we can conceive to be a part of God’s power, necessarily exists (p 35, page 109) He pushes us to believe that everything in existence is necessary so therefore it is impossible for anything to be made independent of necessity. The way nature is, the way people are, are all a part of necessity and therefore a part of God’s essence. Things natured, are things out of necessity, things out of necessity are things that work and exist according to God’s power/essence, including God.
I enjoyed your post. If I am not missing the picture as well, you accurately and concisely summed up Spinoza’s points. Not an easy task.
ReplyDeleteI want to point out two of the phrases that you use, in your second to last paragraph, to summarize the ideas of this section of the Ethics. Likely the expressions are the result of Spinoza’s own ambivalence in his use of certain words, but both the phrases, “God’s intention” (David), and, “ God’s nature is perfect” (David), seem rife with just the kind of teleology Spinoza is attempting to cast off. The second, of course, is deceptive in this regard, as Spinoza means something very different by the word perfect than what we are accustomed to seeing in modern philosophy.
As we discussed in class, and as Spinoza explains in P17 and the Appendix, an understanding of God which allows for an intention is a confused (P17, page 99) and anthropomorphic (Appendix 110) conception. Intention implies will, and God’s will must be understood to be totally alien from human will; as Spinoza says, the two would be the same in name only (P17 page 99). This is ultimately because, as when one thing is the cause of another’s existence, the two must differ as to their existence, so must two things differ in essence if one is the cause of the other. By this reasoning god’s essence, including his intellect and his will, is fundamentally different from that of human beings.
To mention the second phrase, the idea of perfection, as it was used in the philosophy of the time, represents another anthropomorphic idea, derived from a human value judgement regarding the world and its benefit to them (Appendix, page 113). Ultimately, judgements deeming a thing in the world good, bad, well ordered, poorly ordered, perfect or imperfect are ideas brought about by the imagination, rather than the intellect, and bare no truth in the reality of nature (Appendix, page 113). Spinoza’s own idea of perfection is ambiguous. In communicating this idea the only positive description he offers is that, “... the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power...” (Appendix, page 115).
This is quite a thoughtful post. Although you have not formalized your reading explicitly, I think you went close to depict the crux of Spinoza (particularly engraved in this statement: "Nature itself is something that is natured.")
ReplyDeleteYou seem to have centered your discussion around Spinoza's positing of God as "first cause" (Pro. 16, Cor. 3). The crucial qualification here, which you indirectly touched upon, is that God is not a transitive but immanent cause of all things (pro. 16). The positing of God as first cause, if conceived in the sense of temporal/spatial succession, tends to make it contradictory with Spinoza's assertion that God is the immanent, and not transitive cause. As Prof. Vaught clarified it in the class last Wednesday, this first-ness of God will have to be understood logically, not temporally. Spinoza justified immanent causality by saying that since no thing can exist outside of God, it follows that every thing is necessarily conceived through God. In other words, since there is no gap between God and things, causality based upon transition is impossible. The upshot of this point, of course, is his identification of God with nature, as things of nature are unthinkable without the essence of God. By the same token (i.e. the immanence of God), Spinoza can cut through the obvious objection that whether essence of God necessarily involves existence, for he clearly rejects the idea of God as personal/external whose existence can be doubted. If God is immanent to everything that exists, it would be logically absurd to question his existence (insofar as we accept Spinoza's premises).
From what I read both in the books and my own preconceived beliefs, I find it hard to comprehend at times also,but if it does confuse then wouldn't be poignant.What I think Spinoza wants us to do is let go of what we thought about God and to focus on how we can all come to a logical proof of Gods existence. maybe when he mentions things being "natured" he is saying in lay-mans term that things fall into place, these things having a purpose with to it having a determinant affect/effect.
ReplyDeleteNature has a whole new meaning after reading how Spinoza uses the term after reading it again.(most philosophy readings do)Looking at the world this way, God exists because he and he has to for his own purpose much like all things that fall under the definition of being "natured" for and by nature.
By distinguishing Nature into two parts, Spinoza helps us see how God is a part of both of these in P29. Natura naturans is expressing essence, it is what is produced by God; it is substance, what is in itself and conceived through itself. Natura naturata are expressions of essence, the radical diversity of modes, they are things that can not be without substance, without God. Spinoza shows us how God is both what is being created while also creating himself. As Nadler points out, God is both the passive and the active part of Nature. This also helps prove that God is also under the laws of nature, since he is a part of it design. He is in no way outside of it, and while it is easy to think that he is only a part of Natura naturans, he is also a part of Natura natural, for they are expressions of God, and can not be without God.
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