Spinoza's Concept of Method

Distinguishing true knowledge from the inadequate variants of knowledge, Spinoza concentrates on how we can gain access to this supreme form of knowledge. Spinoza defines true knowledge as the knowledge which is acquired by comprehending things through their essence or proximate cause. For Spinoza, method has no external existence from the knowledge, nor is it a road to the true knowledge. Method, rather, is the way through which knowledge reflects upon itself (13). In this post (covering the latter half of the TDIE), I'll try to explicate Spinoza's concept of philosophical method and its place within his theory of knowledge.

Spinoza begins by epistemically differentiating the true idea from the object which it supposedly represents. The idea of an object, thus, constitutes a knowable entity of its own. That means the idea itself can become the idea-essence of another idea. In order to grasp the essence of an object I need not know that I am knowing its idea. The true idea of an object designates the essence of that object, rather than designating the idea-essence of the idea (which is a distinct object). True idea is its own justification. It requires, Spinoza stresses, no justification by method.  

Dispelling the Cartesian approach (which sees method as the structure upon which knowledge stands), Spinoza places knowledge before the method. Method doesn't lead thought to the truth. It has no autonomous existence. In Spinoza's succinct words: " Knowledge must exist before there can be knowledge of knowledge, there will be no methodology unless knowledge exists first" (13). Philosophical method consists in coordinating human mind with the anterior knowledge. Spinoza pinpoints two different parts of the method. Firstly, the reflection on the innate true ideas enables the mind to distinguish between true ideas and others. For clearly grasping this point, we need to link it with Spinoza's treatment of infinite regress in knowledge. What justifies the best-ness of the best method? A second method can justify the first method, a third method does the second one and so on. Since Spinoza posits a first inborn knowledge which is its own justification, he could cut through this apparent deadlock (15). This innate knowledge helps to discover other true knowledge by reflecting upon itself. And this very form of reflection is what we can call the method. Secondly, the growing knowledge of nature redefines the methodological process. By integrating the knowledge of the order of things, the philosophical method eschews useless queries. 

Young Spinoza's conception of method, so to speak, stands at odd with the common-place criticism of him as a philosopher who prioritized formal method over the philosophical content. Hegel famously said that Spinoza's method, being indifferent to the specificity of objects, misconceives the very nature of philosophical knowledge (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 283). Against the grain of such reading, this early reflection of Spinoza on method makes it clear that method doesn't mechanically produce knowledge; it doesn't either determine any regulative approach to knowledge. Coming as it does from the very reflection of knowledge upon itself, Spinozist method denies any methodological precondition of knowledge. In so doing, I would claim, Spinoza radically constructed a preemptive critique of the primacy of method in subsequent theories of knowledge.   

* I used the Joseph Katz translation of TDIE (1958, translated as "On the improvement of the understanding") for the citation.  

Essence, Proximate Causes, and the Rationalist Method:

The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect begins with a discussion of the method by which the “true good” may be found (1). The true good is the means of the perfection of man’s nature (13). For sake of attaining this good we must make a calculated and reasoned intellectual effort. To this end we must recognize how we come to know about things in the world (18), and which methods beget true knowledge, or understanding, of the “essence” of a thing. Spinoza recognizes an understanding which comes of knowing a things “proximate causes” as the method of knowing above all others (29). The method of proximate causes is superior to knowing a thing through report, through random sense perception, or through an understanding derived from a things effects (19). The priority of knowledge through proximate causes makes this form of knowing Spinoza’s candidate for the foundation of his method for the pursuit of the "true good".

Spinoza’s claims that to know something via its essence or proximate causes is the only intellectual method that “... comprehends the adequate essence of the thing and is without danger of error.” (29). In making this claim, defended only by an illustration of a persons’s geometric understanding of the concept of parallelism(24), Spinoza opens the floodgates to numerous objections. The first of which might come from an empiricists, who would doubt that the priority given to knowledge through proximate causes holds when we discuss those kinds of things which exist in the natural world, as opposed to those which have only intellectual existence, such as geometrical concepts.

This objection is especially relevant today, when the natural sciences have departed so far from the realm of the intellect. It is hard to imagine that knowledge of such things as the laws which govern quantum mechanics could have been known in any way other than the empirical (inferential) means by which they were discovered.* A Spinozist might object and argue that the essence of the objects of the quantum world is not found in these laws, and that this essence is not yet known to us. This leaves us with a need to investigate what is meant in Spinoza's work by "essence".

Regarding the nature of essence Spinoza is silent. In this we are left to our own devices. We may start by asking ourselves, in what does the essence of an electron consist; in the subatomic particles which compose it, or in the laws of its behavior, whereby we understand electricity. If it is indeed the former, as S. would insist, we will have to wonder, could such a reductionist approach to understanding the essence of the natural world ever deliver to us any knowledge of the true good, as Spinoza imagines it?

These questions represent one of the fundamental discussions of Spinoza’s time, namely, whether the world can be best understood rationally or empirically. Similarly, we may wonder what, if any, the role of science and the reductionist method is in questions of moral philosophy. Finally, we might ask if Spinoza can support any meaningful discussion of the method by which the true good may be pursued on such weak premises as the priority of knowledge through proximate causes and the existence of essence.

* This reference to quantum mechanics is used to illustrate a scientific truth alien to our usual conception of reason or S.'s conception of the intellect. I do not mean to use the all too common philosophical escape route of referencing quantum mechanics, and making wild claims as to its significance, that is often employed when someone is faced with a situation in which he or she has nothing to say.

Spinoza's Politics: Politics of Naturalization

In recent times, we have been seeing a tendency to dissociate Spinoza's politics from his ontology, as this dissociation allows one to assimilate him in the liberal framework. This way of conceiving Spinoza amounts to a Spinoza without his radical core. Interlinking Spinoza's political thoughts with his ontology, I will try to show that Spinoza's politics is an attempt to naturalize politics in accordance with the ''natural light of reason.” In other words, his political project, to put it in his metaphysical lexicon, is to elevate politics from the state of imagination to the state of reason. Before going any further, the ambiguous  meaning of the word “nature” needs to be clarified. For Spinoza, nature is not something normatively determined (as it is in Descartes), nor does the attempt to naturalize politics entail that it is a transition from non-nature to nature. Rather, it is a transition from the lower modality of nature (i.e. imagination) to the superior one (i.e., reason).


The bedrock of Spinoza's political philosophy, one can argue, is his double-edged concept of human nature. By nature, human beings are passionate entities, who long for “greater benefit” and seek to avoid “greater harm.” However, this is not the only aspect of human nature. This same conatus may also enable human beings to understand the world ade- quately. This is the rational bent of human nature.This aspect of human nature is actualized only through understanding of the actual order and connection among things. Thus, it is no surprise that Spinoza determines “understanding” as one of most important categories of his political theory. In political life, unlike the social life, desire is more powerful than reason.  The driving force of Spinoza's politics, to paraphrase philosopher Errol Harris, is the desire to devise a rational politics which neither suppresses nor gives free rein to the human agency (Spinoza's Philosophy: An Outline, 97).


The demarcation of reason from theology conditions Spinoza's conceptualization of rational theory of democratic state-form. Before entering into the discussion of his concept of state and sovereignty, it is required that we take a brief detour through this question. For  Spinoza, theology boils down to the singularity of prophecy and revelation, as it contains the knowledge as imagination at its most original form (since theological knowledge are not derivable by reason, it only can arrive through revelation). Being capricious and change- able, the sole “object of revealed knowledge is simply obedience”(TTP, 10). In a theocratic  state, this capricious knowledge (which, at best, is morally certain)  becomes the authority of both political and religious sphere. Collapsing faith into politics, this obedience-oriented political system compels citizens to remain stuck in the sphere of negative passion (e.g. fear). Spinoza's politics, in contrast, seeks to re-place politics based on knowledge of imagination with the knowledge of reason.

By carving the desires and by thinking through the dictate of reason, the rational-political agreement of citizens becomes the foundation of the democratic state. This very agreement  simultaneously elevates humans from the state of natural right to the state of civil right. In  the natural state, every “individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything that it can do” (195). In the rational-political state, citizens have to determine a sovereign who assumes  absolute power over individual citizens. In other words, citizens transfer their right to  sovereign. However, no finite entity, Spinoza says, can transfer the totality of his rights to  sovereign. This is where Spinoza definitively rejects Hobbesian concept of sovereignty, which presupposes an absolute transference of rights. By the same token, Spinoza's sovereign is not an abstract individual sovereign. The potentia or constitutive power of individual is inalienable, while the power of authority or potestas is transferable to the  sovereign. By explicating so, Spinoza strikes a delicate balance between the individual  and the sovereign. Ascribing absolute power (only insofar as potentia is concerned) to  the sovereign, Spinoza confronts the question of authority over sacred matters. Spinoza concludes that even in sacred matters citizens are compelled to follow the sovereign, since it will be the right way to obey the god . It may appear that Spinoza's absolutization of the  sovereign's domain poses a limit to the right of the individuals, contradicting his promise to maximize rights. Formulating this dilemma, Spinoza provides an original solution by linking the very sustenance of sovereignty with the individual freedom. That is, individual  freedom needed to be maintained for the sake of the sovereignty itself: “[F]or when...efforts are made to strip men of this liberty...antagonizes rather than frightens people...and incites them to take revenge” (TTP, 259).

Therefore, despite being shifted from the “state of nature”, Spinoza's politics is hinged upon the naturality of reason. This, of course, is not so much a politics in given nature, as rather it is a politics of naturalization. It won't be an exaggeration to maintain, along with Antonio Negri, that the TTP is to be reclaimed as the foundational document  of radical democratic theory.

On Scripture

The word of God has been corrupted and turned into what we now know to be scripture and Spinoza does not believe that this is the true or original state of God’s intention for man. Spinoza challenges the idea that scripture is the divine law because in its current state it has been recorded as a creation of the imagination of the prophets. Spinoza believes that scripture has become for man and extensions of God and in turn scripture is a manifestation of God himself. Spinoza does not deny that for certain individual’s scripture can be divine however; he does not believe scripture is truly the unadulterated word of God (TTP 164).

Spinoza thinks that scripture is nothing but the creation of pious men, who have been blinded by the religiousness and now believe that scripture is God. Much like an idolater worships an idol the pious man has come to worship scripture. Idolatry and worship of symbols is problematic for what scripture attempts to teach. In this way scripture and even idolatry are sacred or profane relatively to what a person believes. However the worshipping and complete faith in scripture is a misuse of its original purpose. It is this worshipping of the words they have written that has caused the pious to neglect the original intent of God’s divine law. Divine law is meant to be written in our hearts by God, because we have the knowledge of rights and wrongs. Objectors to Spinoza "will insist that, even though divine law is written in our hearts, the Bible is still the word of God, and therefore we may not say that it is mutilated and corrupt" (TTP 164). Spinoza goes as far as saying that in opposing his view his adversaries are turning scripture and by extension religion into nothing more than superstition.

Scripture has become a tool to keep men obedient to the ones who can interpret scripture. Scripture participates in the divine law but I believe people fall into trouble when they may scripture out to be God. Spinoza doesn't deny the power or importance of scripture but he does question the intention behind those who manipulate the words to create their own laws and teachings (TTP 170).

Critique of Revelation…

Reading Scripture can be taken literally or figuratively. It is meant as a way to govern our lives and live by an ideal communicated by God. Many if not all religions have prophets who have professed that they were visited by God and had a supernatural experience that left them not only more enlightened, but with words to live by to distribute to any and all his believers and non believers. Spinoza details the way in which revelation and scripture come about and the unique relationship of natural knowledge and divine inspiration (revelation). In his own words he see that revelation does not come to just anyone and takes many forms. In the first chapter of the TTP Spinoza details the different ways God has presented himself to those worthy of him in some of the more obscure ways. He mentions that revelation does not come clearly but at time come by way of images, nature and as man.”…or that Micah saw god seated, Daniel saw him as an old man dressed in white clothes, and Ezekiel as a fire,... (26, TTP), we see God has come in many forms to deliver his word that later became scripture.

The purpose of scripture is to provide followers a moral compass to which God has prescribed and is said to be a good and just life. One major fault Spinoza finds is that though they were the word of God and received though divine revelation, there is a certain vagueness in the writing and leads to a level of subjective argument that cannot be qualified through reason or some measure to which everyone even those in the same religion can agree upon. One of the problems is the language in which it was translated in or handed down. Not only language in the spoken or textual sense. Including dialects, verbiage and/or meaning, the true message he points out can become skew from what the original message is trying to convey to the reader and listener. Idioms in todays language do not translate well and are all subject to interpretation. That being said no one should be able change Gods message either consciously or by unconsciously. But what qualifies Gods word and from whom or what make it so without proof or reason?

Religion, politics...and subjectivity

The preface of the TTP covers a various selection of ideas which are each seperable into their own discourses. If there was an underlying theme of the preface it would have to be exactly what our syllabus labels it to be, and that is "Religion and Politics". Being that this is the preface to the TTP, Spinoza touches upon many things with a particular ambiguity, leaving room for interpretation and only allows the "philosophical reader" (TTP 15) to touch the surface of the works underlying points. The genesis of religion and the acceptance of religion by the masses, to religion's role in civil law, to subjectivity in perspectives and last but not least a proposal for the lawmakers of all epochs of time to consider pushing for ideological freedom; these are the points which I will attempt to address. Let me begin with what I feel is one of the most important points in the TTP's preface, the notion that is explored and elaborated in the first few sections; this idea of fear and superstition being responsible for the creation of and acceptance of religion. Fear, Spinoza says, is directly related to the instances in which prophets, people, and kingdoms become religious. It is only when the solider fears for his life that she/he prays in the name of the holy. "...Superstition must be just as variable and unstable as all absurd leaps of the mind and powerful emotions..." (TTP 5). It is this notion of superstition being a passion which is seperate from reasoning and thus falls in the realm of instability which means that religion is causally unstable. It is under these circumstances of religion that politics is introduced "Kings are adored as gods" (TTP 5). The points in section seven show religions power in tandom with politics; in a monarchy it is this fear and acceptance of religion which causes people to accept the government's fight, because it is in the name of religion and in the name of YOUR being. (It is this section which introduces "all words"/all forms of discourse to be free, a point which I will address soon) In this religious state, (including that of the Muslims, Christians and Jews) according to Spinoza, reason is impious, it is this notion which allows for the controlling of people and the coercion of unorthodox intellectual discourse.

Two more points which are worthy of note is this idea of subjectivity and Spinoza's proposal. In section 12 Spinoza elaborates on the notion of ideological freedom and subjectivity, "...human beings have very different minds and find themselves comfortable with very different beliefs." (TTP 12). Spinoza goes on to say taht this subjectivity is an innate right which should be allowed to be explored throughly and it is this which lawmakers should not deny anybody. A greater claim can be drawn from this idea of subjectivity, Spinoza can be understood as criticizing current civil laws, religously and egoistically thought of as being correc through their own subjective opinion which, Spinoza feels is absolutely wrong. I am-as we all are-confined within my own subjective understanding of Spinoza, It is this idea that Spinoza nails. (and the former ideas, but for lack of a possible onslaught by my classmates I do not directly refer to them.)

Link to Nadler's piece for "The Stone"

One of the blogs for the New York Times site is called "The Stone" and is devoted wholly to philosophical issues and is even written by philosophers (although contested by others).  The most recent posting is from Steven Nadler himself and on Spinoza, surprisingly.

Check it out.

A note from Alex: Nadler's book, for free!

Alex sent me this the other day and stupidly I forgot it until now.  So, if you haven't bought the book, or don't mind not having a hard copy, consult the following (Thanks Alex!!):

Also, regarding the texts for the class, I wanted to let you know that Steven Nadler's book is available as an ebook through CUNY+ for free. I have attached a screenshot & directions so you can email the other students and attach the image if you wish. All they have to do is:

1) Go to hunter.cuny.edu

2) then click on libraries

3) Under "Find", click search CUNY+

4) Search by author, "Nadler, Steven" (or title, but author is how I did it_

5) Click on his name after searching

6) Find the name of the text, "Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction" & click on it

7) Click on "View online: access limited to Hunter College" (make sure its Hunter college and not Baruch, etc)

8) Type in your Net Id and your password (what you use to get wifi at school)

Determinism and Thinking

Jacobi is discussing whether or not there is a distinction between a true determinist and a fatalist, which in turn leads to a discussion of how Spinoza and Leibnitz account for free will.  Since both claim that there is no free will and that everything is a result of what came before it, Jacobi is trying to explain what thought actually is.  The account becomes very confusing when Jacobi starts using Aristotle’s causes as a way of explaining Spinoza.  Now for Aristotle there are four kinds of causes: formal, material, efficient, and final.  Since the first two are irrelevant to the discussion of Spinoza’s account of free will I will skip over them and focus on efficient and final causes. 

            The efficient cause of something is the event that brought that thing into existence.  A final cause is the purpose of that thing.  Now Jacobi says “it turns out that, for Leibnitz as for Spinoza, each and every final cause presupposes an efficient cause…” (On the doctrine of Spinoza, p112).  Since we are not free thinking beings, but rather our thoughts are determined by events that preceded the current event in which we are thinking, Jacobi, as well as Spinoza, must account for what we perceive as thought.  So the question becomes, what is the efficient cause and what is the final cause.

            When thinking of people it is not an issue for Jacobi to claim that thinking is a final cause and that the substance, or the human body doing the thinking, is the efficient cause.  To put this more simply, human beings have bodies.  These bodies have certain organs that perform certain operation, like the heart pumps blood and the brain thinking.  Without a body, a heart would not pump blood and a brain would not think.  Ultimately he is saying that thinking is only caused by there being a brain, which is to say, the mind is just an inseparable part of the body.  The result is that in prior to there being thought, some substance must exist that is material and not-thinking.

            While I think that he is correct in this assessment, I think Jacobi slightly misunderstand Spinoza.  Spinoza doesn’t think that there are final causes.  Rather final causes are merely fictions of the human mind.  According to Spinoza, thinking is merely a byproduct of our human composition, which is pre-determined.  Since everything is determined, there is no purpose to anything, and as such thought is not a final cause, it is just a result of events that took place beforehand.  The question really is whether or not Spinoza is a fatalist as well as a determinist.